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NO. 54 DECEMBER 2018 Introduction 
The Visegrád Group’s Policy towards 
Israel 
Common Values and Interests as a Catalyst for Cooperation 
Joanna Dyduch 
Since 2017, relations between the Visegrád Group (V4) and Israel have been changing. 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are increasingly developing shared 
views and values on international politics and show a greater willingness to cooperate 
economically. This coincides with growing European Union (EU) criticism of the Isra-
eli government’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the V4 states’ leaders 
do not necessarily share that criticism, and they have even aligned themselves with 
Israeli viewpoints on issues such as migration, security, and threat perceptions, all of 
which are disputed in the EU. The EU needs to be aware that this positioning of the 
V4 states might lead to a growing internal divergence concerning its Israel policy. 
This would especially hold true if it were to increase pressure on Israel, as some EU 
members envisage. 
 
In a Joint Statement issued during the V4-
Israel summit in Budapest in 2017, the V4 
leaders “reaffirmed their support for a 
viable two-state solution and the right of 
Israel to live in security and peaceful co-
existence with all its neighbours, including 
Palestinians”. On the surface, this is in line 
with the EU’s approach for solving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict through the creation of 
an independent Palestinian state. However, 
even though no V4 country has challenged 
the EU’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, certain political actions and sym-
bolic gestures (even if devoid of legal effect) 
indicate that the V4 are distancing them-
selves gradually from the EU’s approach. 
Differences between the V4 and 
the EU in Addressing the Middle 
East Conflict 
For the EU, the Middle East conflict and its 
resolution are a central aspect of its rela-
tions with Israel. In this context, Israel is 
often criticised by EU officials for its poli-
cies towards Palestinians, especially with re-
gard to the occupation and settlement poli-
cies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
which are seen as obstacles to conflict reso-
lution. 
Political and legal steps to differentiate 
between settlements and Israel proper (the 
so-called differentiation policy) accompany 
EU criticism, e.g. the EU guideline regard-
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ing Israeli activities in the occupied territo-
ries (2013) or the European Commission’s 
“Interpretative Notice” on labelling goods 
originating from Israeli-occupied territories 
issued in 2015. Compared with this general 
EU approach, the V4 states are taking a dif-
fering stance. Examples include the rejec-
tion by the Czech and Hungarian parlia-
ments in December 2015 of the labelling of 
Israeli settlement goods; the announcement 
of Czech President Milos Zeman to relocate 
the embassy to Jerusalem (which is opposed 
by Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis) in 
April 2018; and the successful blocking of 
a joint EU statement by Hungary and the 
Czech Republic (alongside Romania) that 
aimed to condemn the US embassy move to 
Jerusalem. In addition, the V4 governments 
have also frequently abstained from voting 
in the UN General Assembly or even voted 
against when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
has been reviewed. 
The V4 states were not seeking an open 
conflict in Brussels about those differences, 
as the issue still is of a relatively low priori-
ty in the public discourse of the V4. Yet, the 
role of the EU within the Middle East Peace 
Process could be affected in that context: 
While a majority of EU member states dis-
cuss potential measures by the EU, includ-
ing placing more pressure on Israel, the V4 
governments rather aim to support Israel. 
This divergence is catalysed by the fact that 
the V4 states find themselves in disagree-
ment with several issues at the EU level, 
which includes not only several foreign 
policy issues but also normative questions. 
Security as a Normative Priority: 
Emerging Convergence between 
the V4 and Israel 
The deviation of the V4 states from the EU’s 
policy towards Israel takes place against the 
background of a discernible ideological rap-
prochement between these governments 
and Israeli leadership on issues of national 
security. There are many parallels in how 
the V4 and Israeli politicians define threats 
to national security as well as the necessary 
means to defend fundamental values. Most 
of all, they share a sense of importance of 
the nation. Since the V4 have experienced 
Soviet domination, they tend to empathise 
with Israel’s struggle for survival and secu-
rity. Moreover, in the V4 states, the legacies 
of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the Munich 
Agreement (1938), and the Yalta Conference 
(1945) have resulted in a shared narrative – 
that the existence of independent nation-
states might not be a given fact, but rather 
that they are entities which continually 
need to be defended. This has prompted the 
Visegrád governments to adopt a politically 
realist approach – much like in Israel – 
that focusses on power relations rather than 
on norms and ideals when dealing with 
international conflicts. In this framework, 
the threat to national sovereignty or to the 
political and/or cultural survival of the 
nation is not merely seen as a problem of 
the past. Therefore liberalism, which empha-
sises the significance of the individual, 
human rights, and civil liberties, is often 
consciously portrayed as being inadequate, 
or even dangerous, in both Israel and the 
V4 whenever the nation is confronted with 
an existential threat – be it real or per-
ceived. This particularly applies to Poland 
and Hungary. The quest for security has 
been an issue in these states for some time; 
however, since 2008/09 the scope of the 
process that can be called “securitisation” 
has been broadened. Governments in Israel 
and the V4 have successfully shifted the 
public discourse by framing several issues 
of public concern as being security-related 
problems. Migration, trade exchange, the 
judiciary system, limiting the leeway of 
political manoeuvring, and the allegedly 
excessively liberal media are examples of 
policy areas that are being “securitised”. 
The results of this process are the ongoing 
consolidation and centralisation of power, 
a decline in the levels of pluralism, and 
shrinking spaces for civil society activities. 
For example, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
has been criticised both domestically and 
internationally for limiting fundamental 
freedoms, acting against civil society, and 
also for using anti-Semitic clichés and 
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stereotypes. A campaign against Hungarian-
born, US-Jewish billionaire George Soros 
launched in Hungary since 2017 can be 
perceived as an example of this phenome-
non. Soros is portrayed similarly by Israeli 
officials, namely as a danger to Israel due to 
his alleged support of immigration, and 
thus terrorism. The campaign in Hungary 
has been followed by legislation that pro-
vides the means of generally criminalising 
organisations “promoting illegal migration”. 
Still, the government’s argumentation that 
they simply aim to prevent Hungary from 
becoming destabilised through an increased 
influx of immigrants has been convincing, 
and even welcomed by the majority of the 
society (in April 2018 Orbán’s party, Fidesz, 
again won the election with 49.27% of 
the votes cast and a voter turnout rate of 
70.22%). This trend is also reflected in sur-
veys among V4 citizens, in which the big-
gest problems facing Europe today are 
named as terrorism (CZ: 20%, HU: 26%, 
PL: 18%, SK: 20%) and immigration control 
(CZ: 26%, HU: 18%, PL: 10%, SK: 12%). This 
suits the Israeli self-perception of being a 
besieged nation and in conflict with the 
“Arab” or “Muslim world”, respectively. Ad-
ditionally, Prime Minister Benjamin Netan-
yahu is trying to convince the West that 
Israel’s enemies are also their enemies, and 
that migration is a potential threat to 
Europe. This is probably the strongest com-
monality between the V4 states and Israel. 
Especially the fear of unwanted migration 
and the perceived threat of terrorism (un-
ambiguously associated with Islamist ex-
tremism) have led to a convergence between 
the governments of the V4 and Israel, re-
sulting in an intensification of cooperation 
on security affairs. 
But the far-reaching securitisation pro-
cess within the V4 also has implications for 
the attitude towards the EU, which the V4 
identify with having a predominance of 
left-liberal values. This attitude is perceived 
as being challenging – or even threatening 
– to the neoconservative vision pertaining 
to the security and welfare of the nation. In 
the light of these developments the V4 states 
are receptive to criticism of the EU presented 
by Netanyahu, e.g. during the V4-Israel sum-
mit in Budapest in 2017, when he felt com-
fortable addressing the V4 leaders behind 
the curtains and saying: “The EU is under-
mining its security by undermining Israel 
[…] by a crazy attempt to create conditions.” 
However, a limiting factor for coopera-
tion are the differing views on the respec-
tive histories, especially the sensitive issue 
of the Second World War and the Holocaust. 
One example of this are the public debates 
in Israel about the legal amendment in 
Poland stating that making claims about 
Poland’s responsibility for Nazi German 
crimes would be punishable by law. This 
sparked a discussion in Israel, with claims 
being made that the authorities in Poland 
would be “whitewashing” their history. A 
similar controversy followed when Orbán 
praised Hungarian wartime leader and Nazi 
collaborator Miklos Hórty in a speech on 
21 June 2017. Nevertheless, public criticism 
and dissatisfaction had little impact on rela-
tions at the intergovernmental level. 
Economic Cooperation as a 
“Testing Ground” for a Closer 
Relationship 
The political rapprochement between the 
V4 states and Israel has been accompanied 
by an increased willingness for economic 
cooperation. At the Budapest summit in 
2017, the V4 states expressed their interest 
in cooperation in the field of innovation, 
research and development, and the transfer 
of Israeli technology, as well as energy co-
operation. For the latter, there is a special 
focus on the opportunities offered by Israel’s 
natural gas reservoirs. Some V4 states – 
first and foremost Poland – view Europe’s 
dependency on Russian gas deliveries with 
great concern. In that view, Israel can help 
to diversify gas imports and decrease the 
EU’s dependency on Russia. Following the 
summit, two “working groups” were formed: 
one focussing on security and combating 
terrorism, a second dealing with research, 
development and innovations. Similarly, 
the “Memorandum of Understanding on 
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Training Cooperation in the Field of Innova-
tion” (signed on 18 June 2018) between the 
V4, Israel, and the International Visegrád 
Fund envisions short-term, intensive train-
ing programmes on best practices in the 
Israeli innovation ecosystem for selected 
entrepreneurs from V4 states. The desire to 
increase investment volumes and trade 
exchanges between the V4 and Israel has 
been frequently highlighted by the political 
leaders. However, the current trade ex-
change between the V4 and Israel remains 
at a relatively low level compared to the 
EU’s total trade exchange with Israel. Never-
theless, the V4 states’ business transactions 
with Israel are continuously growing. For 
both the V4 and Israel, mutual trade is a 
win-win situation: The V4 are looking for 
Israeli technological expertise and trade, 
and in return they can provide the cheap, 
yet qualified labour force that is needed by 
innovative Israeli industries. 
Finally, the V4 states’ officials have re-
peatedly expressed interest in Israeli secu-
rity technologies, the purchase of Israeli 
weapons and equipment, as well as in train-
ings with the Israeli military. Examples of 
concluded deals are Poland’s purchases of 
rockets and missile defence systems in 
2016; cooperation between the Polish and 
Israeli aerospace industries on unmanned 
aircraft and electronic warfare systems in 
2017; and in 2018 a partnership between 
the respective industries to develop light 
attack aircrafts. The context of the arms 
deals is remarkable, since it yet again di-
verges from Western European attitudes 
towards Israel. In accordance with the V4’s 
national security and trade interests, Israeli 
security technology is perceived as contrib-
uting to global security. On the level of the 
European Union, however, security coop-
eration with Israel remains a contested 
issue. Therefore, economic interactions 
with Israel can be seen as a testing ground 
for a deepening and strengthening of gen-
eral relations with Israel. 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
The growing closeness between the V4 and 
Israel is a new factor in EU policy concern-
ing the Middle East Peace Process. Although 
the EU’s position on the conflict has always 
been a result of compromises between the 
member states, the growing level of diver-
gence within the EU limits its possibility 
even further to act through comprehensive 
incentives or pressure. In addition, the 
diverging positions are a gateway for inter-
ference and lobby activism by both parties 
to the conflict. On a general level, the V4 
states are interested in preserving the EU 
consensus, which means upholding the 
two-state solution as the only mechanism 
for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
However, the V4 governments are already 
wary of the steps being taken by the EU to 
pressure Israel. The differentiation policy is 
a case in point of this behaviour. Although 
the V4 support the policy in principle, they 
are not particularly eager to implement it. 
From a V4 perspective, it is most important 
to maintain and strengthen the existing 
“two-state solution consensus” within the 
EU instead of intensifying measures, for ex-
ample curbing Israeli settlement construc-
tion, as suggested by some EU members. 
This stance is reinforced by the fact that 
those states which, in the V4 perspective, 
have been most critical of Israel – France 
and Sweden in particular – are also per-
ceived as marginalising the V4 and their 
political views. Whereas the V4 states’ rela-
tions with Israel cannot, of course, substi-
tute for the political or economic European 
integration of the Visegrád Group’s mem-
bers, both their political closeness to Israel 
and a discerned marginalisation within the 
EU make it more likely that the V4 will 
deviate from the EU acquis regarding the 
Middle East Peace Process. Especially if the 
EU continues to increase its critical stance 
on Israel, the V4 may resist this trend. 
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